In the context of public key cryptography, the McEliece cryptosystem represents a very smart solution based on the hardness of the decoding problem, which is believed to be able to resist the advent of quantum computers. Despite this, the original McEliece cryptosystem, based on Goppa codes, has encountered limited interest in practical applications, partly because of some constraints imposed by this very special class of codes. We have recently introduced a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem including low-density parity-check codes, that are stateof-art codes, now used in many telecommunication standards and applications. In this paper, we discuss the possible use of a bit-flipping decoder in this context, which gives a significant advantage in terms of complexity. We also provide theoretical arguments and practical tools for estimating the trade-off between security and complexity, in such a way to give a simple procedure for the system design.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a renewed interest has been devoted to the McEliece cryptosystem [1] , which is one of the most attractive options for post-quantum public key cryptography. It exploits error correcting codes to obtain both the private and the public key. Its security relies on the difficulty of decoding a linear code. More precisely, two kinds of attacks can be mounted against this system. The first one aims at retrieving the private key from the public key, while the second one tries to recover the cleartext from the ciphertext, without the knowledge of the private key.
that the intrinsic code sparsity is exploited by an attack to the dual of the public code [13] .
However, it has also been shown that, by replacing the permutation matrix used for obtaining the public key with a more general transformation matrix, the code sparsity can be hidden and the attack to the dual code avoided [14] . Unfortunately, the proposal in [14] still used only sparse transformations, which exposed it to a total break attack [15] . Subsequently, however, we have presented a simple modification that allows to avoid such flaw, so obtaining a QC-LDPC codes-based cryptosystem that is immune to any known attack [16] . Such variant of the cryptosystem is able to reduce the key size with respect to the original version and to achieve increased transmission rate. Moreover, the size of its public keys increases linearly with the code dimension; so, it scales favorably when larger keys are needed for facing the increasing computing power.
In this paper, we elaborate on our last proposal, first by introducing bit-flipping decoding for the QC-LDPC codes, which yields a significant reduction in the decoding complexity, at the cost of a moderate loss in terms of error correction performance. The performance of bit-flipping decoding can be easily predicted through theoretical arguments, and this helps dimensioning the system, without the need of long numerical simulations. We also consider the most effective attack procedures known up to now and estimate analytically their work factor (WF). This way, we provide tools that permit the designer to easily find the best set of system parameters to optimize the trade-off between security and complexity.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II we describe the proposed version of QC-LDPC codes-based cryptosystem; in Section III we describe the encryption and decryption algorithms and evaluate their complexity; in Section IV we assess the security level of the system; finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. MCELIECE CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON QC-LDPC CODES
The main functions of the McEliece cryptosystem based on QC-LDPC codes are shown in Fig. 1 : QC-LDPC codes with length n = n 0 · p, dimension k = (n 0 − 1) p and redundancy r = p are adopted, where n 0 is a small integer (e.g., n 0 = 3, 4), while p is a large integer (on the order of some thousands). For fixed values of the parameters, the private key is formed by the sparse parity-check matrix H of one of these codes, randomly chosen, having the following form:
that is, a row of n 0 circulant blocks H i , each with row (column) weight d v . Without loss of generality, we can suppose that H n0−1 is non singular; so, a systematic generator matrix for the code is G = [I|P], where I represents the k × k identity matrix and
where superscript T denotes transposition.
Let us denote by h i , i = 0 . . . n 0 − 1, the vector containing the positions of symbols 1 in the first row of the matrix H i , i = 0 . . . n 0 − 1. It is easy to show that, if all the h i vectors have disjoint sets of differences modulo p, the matrix H is free of length-4 cycles in its associated
Tanner graph. The secret code can be easily constructed by randomly selecting n 0 vectors h i with such property. This permits us to obtain large families of codes with identical parameters [14] . Under the LDPC decoding viewpoint, most of the codes in a family have the same
properties; so, they show comparable error correction performance when belief propagation decoding algorithms are adopted.
In the QC-LDPC codes-based cryptosystem, Bob chooses a secret QC-LDPC code by generating its parity-check matrix, H, and chooses other two secret matrices: a k × k non singular scrambling matrix S and an n × n non singular transformation matrix Q with row/column weight m. Then, he obtains a systematic generator matrix G for the secret code, in the form
, and produces his public key as:
The public key is a dense matrix, but, since we adopt QC-LDPC codes, the knowledge of one row of each circulant block is sufficient to describe it. We notice that, differently from the original McEliece cryptosystem, the public code is not permutation-equivalent to the private code. In fact, the permutation matrix used in the original system [1] has been replaced by Q, that is a sparse n × n matrix, with rows and columns weight m > 1. This way, the LDPC matrix of the secret code (H) is mapped into a new parity-check matrix for the public code:
and, through a suitable choice of m, the density of H ′ can be made high enough to avoid attacks to the dual code.
Alice fetches G ′ from the public directory, divides her message into k-bit words, and applies the encryption map as follows:
where x is the ciphertext corresponding to the cleartext u, and e is a random vector of t ′ intentional errors. After receiving x, Bob inverts the transformation as follows:
thus obtaining a codeword of the secret LDPC code affected by the error vector e · Q, with weight ≤ t = t ′ m. Bob should be able to correct all the errors through LDPC decoding and to obtain u · S −1 . Finally, he can recover u through multiplication by S.
We note from (6) that the introduction of the matrix Q causes an error propagation effect (at most by a factor m) within each received frame. This is compensated by the high error correction capability of the QC-LDPC code, that must be able to correct up to t errors. Suitable QC-LDPC codes can be designed for such purpose. However, we must also note that, contrary to the McEliece cryptosystem based on Goppa codes, which corrects all errors of a certain prescribed weight, the decoding radius of LDPC codes is usually unknown. So, there is a small probability that Bob fails to recover the secret message. To prevent such event, different procedures can be implemented. First, Bob can make a careful selection of the private code, rather than just picking up the first code randomly generated. In fact, the number of codes that can be obtained through random-based approaches, like random difference families [14] , is impressively high. Secondly, when the cryptosystem is used for data transmissions, an automatic repeat request (ARQ) protocol can allow Alice to know whether Bob is able to correct all the errors she has randomly introduced or not. Indeed, Bob is able to detect uncorrected frames through the parity check performed by the LDPC decoder, and, consequently, he can request retransmission. In this case, a new random vector is generated by Alice, and the procedure is repeated until a correctable error pattern is obtained. In principle, this exposes the system to message-resend attacks, but a simple modification of the cryptosystem is known that prevents these attacks without significant drawbacks [17] . Obviously, this additional effort increases the latency, but the problem is not serious if the number of errors is properly chosen and controlled.
III. ENCRYPTION, DECRYPTION AND THEIR COMPLEXITY

A. Key size and transmission rate
In the QC-LDPC codes-based cryptosystem, due to the special form (1) of the matrix H, the code rate is (n 0 − 1)/n 0 . In the following, we will focus on two values of n 0 , namely:
, which give transmission rates equal to 2/3 and 3/4, respectively.
The public key is a binary matrix formed by k 0 × n 0 circulant blocks, each with size p × p.
Since each circulant block is completely described by a single row (or column), that is, p bits, the public key size is The values of the key size (expressed in bytes) are reported in Table I , for n 0 = 3, 4 and for a set of values of p that we will consider throughout the paper. All choices of the system parameters we have considered give smaller key size and higher transmission rate than those of the original McEliece cryptosystem (that has key size 67072 bytes and rate 0.51) [1] and its Niederreiter version (that has key size 32750 bytes and rate 0.57) [2] .
B. Multiplication by circulant matrices
A fundamental point for reducing complexity in the considered cryptosystem is to adopt efficient algorithms for performing multiplication of a circulant matrix by a vector.
Since circulant matrices are also Toeplitz matrices, an effective algorithm for fast computation of vector-matrix products is the Winograd convolution [18] . The Winograd algorithm is a generalization of the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm, that has been reviewed even recently, in the perspective to allow fast VLSI implementations [19] . If we consider a p × p Toeplitz matrix T, with even p, we can decompose it as follows:
where I and 0 are the p/2 × p/2 identity and null matrix, respectively, and T 0 , T 1 , T 2 are p/2 × p/2 Toeplitz matrices, as well as T 1 − T 0 and T 2 − T 0 . It follows that the multiplication of a vector V = [V 0 V 1 ] by the matrix T can be split into three phases:
• Evaluation phase: multiplication of V by the first matrix translates into the addition of two p/2-bit vectors (V 0 and V 1 ); so, its cost, in terms of binary operations, is p/2.
• Multiplication phase: the vector resulting from the evaluation phase must be multiplied by the second matrix. This translates into 3 vector-matrix products by p/2 × p/2 Toeplitz matrices. If p/2 is even, the three multiplications can be computed in a recursive way, by splitting each of them into four p/4 × p/4 blocks. If p/2 is odd (or sufficiently small to make splitting no more advantageous), the vector-matrix multiplication can be performed in the traditional way and its complexity is about (p/2) 2 /2.
• Interpolation phase: the result of the multiplication phase must be multiplied by the third matrix. This requires 2 additions of p/2-bit vectors, that is, further p binary operations.
The matrix G ′ used in the QC-LDPC codes-based cryptosystem is formed by k 0 ×n 0 circulant blocks with size p × p. When a vector is multiplied by such matrix, we can split the vector into k 0 -bit subvectors and consider k 0 ·n 0 vector-matrix multiplications. However, we must take into account that the evaluation phase on the k 0 -bit subvectors must be performed only once, and that further (k 0 − 1) · n 0 · p binary operations are needed for re-combining the result of multiplication by each column of circulants.
C. Encryption operations and complexity
Encryption is performed by calculating the product u · G ′ and then adding the intentional error vector e. So, the encryption complexity can be estimated by considering the cost of a vector-matrix multiplication through the Winograd convolution and adding n binary operations for summing the intentional error vector. Table II reports the values of the encryption complexity, expressed in terms of the number of binary operations needed for each encrypted bit, as a function of the circulant matrix size p, for n 0 = 3 and n 0 = 4. The use of the Winograd convolution is particularly efficient when p is a power of 2, since, in such cases, recursion can be exploited to the utmost.
D. Decryption operations and complexity
Bob must perform the following three operations for decrypting the received message: 1) calculate the product x · Q;
2) decode the secret LDPC code;
3) calculate the product u ′ · S.
Matrices Q and S are formed, respectively, by n 0 × n 0 and k 0 × k 0 circulant blocks. However, while the matrix S is dense, the matrix Q is sparse (with row/column weight m ≪ n). So, it is advantageous to use the traditional multiplication (requiring n · m binary operations) for calculating the product x · Q. On the contrary, the complexity of step 3) can be reduced by resorting to the Winograd convolution for efficient multiplication of a vector by a circulant matrix. Concerning step 2), Bob must exploit the secret LDPC matrix to implement a suitable decoding algorithm for trying to correct all intentional errors (that are ≤ t = t ′ m). LDPC decoding is usually accomplished through iterative decoding algorithms, which work on the code Tanner graph, and implement the belief propagation principle to provide very good error correction capability. Among them: the sum-product algorithm (SPA) [20] and the bit-flipping (BF) algorithm [21] . The SPA exploits real valued messages and ensures the best performance on channels with soft information. When the latter is not available, as it occurs in our case, it may be advantageous to use the BF algorithm, which works on binary messages and requires very low complexity, though its performance is not as good as that of the SPA.
The principle of the BF algorithm was devised in Gallager's seminal work for LDPC codes with a tree representation [21] . Given an LDPC parity-check matrix with column weight We have already observed that, differently from algebraic hard-decision codes, the decoding radius of LDPC codes is generally unknown. So, numerical simulations are usually exploited for estimating their performance, but such approach is time demanding and unpractical for the purpose of dimensioning the QC-LDPC codes-based cryptosystem. In the following, we show how we can estimate the performance of the BF algorithm, when applied in the considered scenario, through theoretical arguments that are very similar to those developed in [22] .
Let us suppose that Bob, after having received the ciphertext, performs decoding through Algorithm A. At each iteration of the algorithm, we denote by p cc the probability that a bit is not in error and a generic parity-check equation evaluates it correctly. Instead, p ci is the probability that a bit is not in error and a parity-check equation evaluates it incorrectly. Similarly, p ic and p ii are the probabilities that a bit is in error and a parity-check equation evaluates it correctly and incorrectly, respectively. In the considered context, by using simple combinatorial arguments, it is possible to verify that the following expressions hold:
where d c = n 0 · d v is the row weight of the matrix H and q l is the average number of residual errors after the l-th iteration. It must be q 0 ≤ t = t ′ m; we fix q 0 = t = t ′ m in order to obtain worst-case estimates (maximum error propagation).
Let us suppose that, after the l-th iteration, the estimate of a bit is in error. Based on (8),
we can calculate the probability that, during the subsequent iteration, the message originating from its corresponding variable node is correct; this can be expressed as:
Similarly, the probability of incorrectly evaluating, in a single iteration of the algorithm, a bit that is not in error can be expressed as:
Under the ideal assumption of a cycle-free Tanner graph (that implies to consider an infinitelength code), the average number of residual bit errors at the l-th iteration, q l , results in:
Based on this recursive procedure, we can calculate a waterfall threshold by finding the maximum value t = t th such that lim l→∞ (q l ) = 0. In more realistic scenarios, with finite code lengths and closed loops in the Tanner graphs, also adopting a finite number of decoding iterations, there is no guarantee that the error rate is arbitrarily small for t ≤ t th . In this sense, the values in Table III should be seen as an optimistic assumption. However, we can observe that the performance achievable by BF with fixed b can be improved in a number of ways.
One of these improvements has been mentioned above, and consists in using Algorithm B (i.e., variable b). On the other hand, more recently, the original Gallager's algorithms have been made more efficient through further, and more elaborated, variants [23] , [24] . Such improved versions reduce the gap in performance with respect to the SPA, which is able to reach extremely small error rates for values of t even above the BF threshold t th [7] . So, taking into account these aspects, we can consider the BF threshold values as reliable approximations of the decoding radius of the considered QC-LDPC codes.
As concerns complexity, we can estimate the number of binary operations needed for each this requires further 2d v operations. So, the total number of operations at variable nodes is n(3d v ). In conclusion, the cost of one iteration of bit flipping can be estimated as
Based on (12), and considering the computational effort required for calculating the x·Q and u ′ · S products, we can estimate the total cost, in terms of binary operations, for each decrypted bit. The values obtained are reported in Table IV , where m = 7 has been assumed and a BF algorithm with 10 average iterations has been considered. By using the same parameters, and considering v = 6 quantization bits for the decoder messages, we have estimated the decryption complexity with SPA decoding [7] ; the results are reported in Table V . To decode by using the SPA guarantees the best error correction performance at the threshold value t = t th . However, in comparison with Table IV , the adoption of BF decoding gives a significant advantage over the SPA in terms of decryption complexity.
IV. SECURITY LEVEL
Attacks can be divided into two classes:
• attacks aimed at recovering the secret code; • attacks aimed at decrypting the transmitted ciphertext.
As we have shown in [16] , [7] , the proper use of the matrices S and Q to disguise the secret code in the public matrix is able to prevent attacks exploiting its sparsity (even within its dual).
More precisely, the most dangerous attacks of the first type (like the attack to the dual code and OTD attacks [15] ) can be prevented by choosing a dense S matrix and a sparse Q matrix.
The latter may have, for example, row and column weight m = 7.
On the contrary, due to the low weight (t ′ ) of the intentional error vector, decoding attacks of the second type are more dangerous and, in many cases, provide the smallest WF.
Decoding attacks aim at solving the decoding problem, that is, obtaining the error vector e used for encrypting a ciphertext. A way for finding e is to search for the minimum weight codewords of an extended code, generated by:
The WF of such attacks can be determined by referring to the Stern's algorithm [25] . More precisely, we have used an updated version of this algorithm [26] , that results in minimum WF for the class of codes here considered. It must be said that several advances have recently appeared in the literature for improving the running time of the best decoding algorithms for binary random codes (see [27] , [28] , for example). These papers, however, often aim at evaluating the performance of information set decoding in asymptotic conditions, i.e., for codes with infinite length. Moreover, they cannot be used to estimate the WF in the case of codes with finite length, like those of interest in our study. Even the so called "ball collision decoding", recently proposed [29] , is not applicable effectively, as it reduces the WF for rates close to 0.5, very long codes and error patterns with large weight; all these conditions do not hold for the codes here of interest and, in fact, the application of [29] does not yield any reduction in the WF.
On the other hand, we must observe that, in the QC-LDPC codes-based cryptosystem, a further speedup is obtained by considering that, because of the quasi-cyclic property of the codes, each block-wise cyclically shifted version of the ciphertext x is still a valid ciphertext.
So, the eavesdropper can continue extending G ′′ by adding block-wise shifted versions of x, and can search for one among as many shifted versions of the error vector. So, in order to estimate the minimum WF, we have considered the optimum number of shifted ciphertexts that can be used by an attacker in the generator matrix of the extended code. For each QC-LDPC code, we have calculated the maximum number of intentional errors t ′ = ⌊t/m⌋ by considering m = 7 and the estimated error correction capability t reported in Tables II and IV , are determined by 1206 and 1790 operations per bit, respectively.
So, complexity increases in the encryption stage, but, by exploiting the BF algorithm, the decryption complexity is reduced.
So, we can conclude that, for achieving the same security level, the QC-LDPC codes-based cryptosystem can adopt smaller keys and comparable or higher transmission rates with respect to the classical McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems. Moreover, this does not come at the expense of a significantly increased complexity.
At the end of this section, it is also interesting to observe that our system is immune against a new class of distinguishers for high rate McEliece cryptosystems, recently developed in [32] .
According to that approach, the key-recovery problem is transformed into the one of solving an algebraic system and, when applicable, the distinguisher permits to recognize a generator matrix of the considered code from a randomly picked binary matrix. This transformation cannot be applied to the QC-LDPC codes of the type we have considered. Although the existence of a distinguisher cannot be considered as a proof of weakness, the non-existence is a further argument in favor of the robustness of the QC-LDPC codes-based cryptosystem.
V. CONCLUSION
We have deepened the analysis of a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem using QC-LDPC codes in place of Goppa codes. Such modification is aimed at overcoming the main drawbacks of the original system, while still allowing to reach a satisfactory security level.
We have proposed to adopt bit flipping algorithms for decoding the QC-LDPC codes, in such a way as to achieve a rather good performance while strongly reducing the decoding complexity with respect to the SPA. The adoption of bit flipping decoding has also allowed to develop simple analytical tools for estimating the error correction capability of the considered codes, thus simplifying the system design by avoiding the need for long numerical simulations.
Together with the methods we have described to evaluate complexity, these tools provide the system designer a fast procedure for optimizing the choice of the cryptosystem parameters.
